Transforming Higher Education: Economy, Democracy, and The University

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Chapter One

Corporate MisEducation and the Liberal Arts Response

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The American university is a battered figure on the public domain, half relic of the past, half orphan of the present, celebrated on the dais while denigrated in the boardroom, swamped by passing fads, starved by state legislatures and fated finally, it seems, to have its different pieces auctioned off to the highest bidder. If it also remains a special realm for the cultivation of the mind, the last self-governing community in the country and a critical public sphere, it maintains those other aspects against long and ever-mounting odds. The forces buffeting the institution are well noted in the chapters of this book.

State disinvestment has compelled retrenchments and forced higher tuitions, restricting access to higher education in the process.[1] A growing cohort of contingent part-timers has introduced a two-tier faculty and undermined academic freedom in the institution as a whole. Partnership with powerful corporations has ceded strategic areas of decision making to outsiders. Managerial efforts to centralize authority via bogus assessment schemes demoralize campuses and add to faculty workload. Pursuit of a plethora of new projects, institutes, and sideline activities threaten to reduce universities' academic element, Stanley Aronowitz notes, to but "an ornament . . . [and] legitimating mechanism for a host of more prosaic [job-training] functions."[2] Distance education depersonalizes learning. Academic entrepreneurship shreds the bonds of collegiality. And voices of the bottom line call for an end to tenure.

Within this maelstrom of forces and pressures a master trend is apparent, however, forcing most of the changes and aggravating the effects of the rest, a trend we must acknowledge if we are not to miss the changing academic forest for the imperiled trees. That is the corporatization of the university. It is a varied process, the effects of which are apparent not only in the acade-

my's increasing subservience to business interests and vocabulary[3] but also in its adoption of corporate forms of governance and criteria of performance. This larger process accounts for the growing propensity of educational managers to view the academic forest in terms of board-feet of timber.

The process is inimical to the ethics and objectives of the university for the reasons Sidney Plotkin notes in his chapter. It is also inimical to the larger society because in ultimately attempting to privatize a major public resource it threatens the destruction of a key public sphere and the enclosure of the nation's knowledge commons.[4]

Changes of this magnitude forced on a primary social institution would normally provoke resistance on the part of the populace and indignant demands to return to the way things used to be. But though many struggles have agitated American campuses in the last few years the resistance has been sporadic and short-lived. And the reasons are not far to see. First, the status quo ante provides no grounds for appeal in this case. It was precisely the earlier era's arrangements and teachings, in the form of a narrative about the growth and goal of American higher education that prepared the way for this transformation and made it seem inevitable. (Many intellectuals helped by playing the "custodial" role for that narrative that Plotkin describes.) Second, faculty acquired a professional identity as part of that tale that, though it was a mistaken identity, confined their intellectual roles to their disciplines or college, left larger decisions to others, and hobbled their abilities to play public roles.

In order for the corporatization of the university to be resisted and the older promise of the American university reclaimed we need to understand how that trend became dominant, why the narrative seemed persuasive, and what the alternatives are for the American university. If, moreover, faculty are to be genuine professionals and shake off the blinders of the mid-century identity, they will need to establish their own standpoint and point of view rather than accepting the outlook fashioned by administrators and foundations for non-academic purposes. The inchoate outlines of a different model for the university, a different professional identity, and different point of view are discernible in the protests organized on the nation's campuses in the last few years by tenured faculty, contingent faculty, and graduate students. It is a model, an identity, and a point of view that follow from the tradition of genuine universities and the retrieval of a neglected wing of the liberal arts past.

THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

The Knowledge Industry: Narrative and Reality

The 1950s and early 1960s were the gilded age of the American university, the period in which a major social compact was concluded assuring universities of broad public support in return for their provision of higher education at low tuition to the nation's youth and innovative research for public authorities and private industry. The development of federal contract support and perfection of the device of contract overhead, invented during World War II and bolstered later by the 1958 National Defense Education Act, gave rise to the federal grant university. The $1.5 billion in federal monies it received in 1960 amounted to "a hundredfold increase in twenty years."[5]

Postsecondary enrollments rose dramatically, tripling from 1945 to the late 1950s, and then nearly doubled again to eight million students by the late 1960s. More faculty were hired than had been hired in the 325-year history of American higher education up till then. Community colleges opened at the rate of one a week by the end of the 1960s.[6]

Clark Kerr, the nationally known educator and president of the University of California system, described the product of this rapid development in his celebrated *The Uses of the University* as a "multiversity," a composite of three parts: the older liberal arts institution eulogized by John Henry Cardinal Newman, the research and professional training institute described by Abraham Flexner, and the new production site of socially useful knowledge depicted by Kerr himself. The first "had its devotees," the second, "its supporters," and the third, Kerr observed, "its practitioners, chiefly the administrators, who now number many faculty among them, and the leadership groups in society."[7]

As a result of the latter influence the multiversity was very much a research institution. And Kerr saw it would be a key facility for useful "knowledge production and distribution" for the knowledge-based society then emerging. He and the milieu for which he spoke took pride in the fact that to accomplish this, the university "and segments of industry are becoming more alike." Higher education was "being called upon . . . to merge its activities with industry." The university itself was becoming a "knowledge industry." Expressing a confidence in the technocratic ascendance that hearkened back to James Burnham's *Managerial Revolution,* if not Saint-Simon, Kerr explained that the expert knowledge wielded by the new mandarins would guide both private efforts and federal largesse to provide unimagined benefits for advanced industrial society.[8]

This is not to say that he saw the managed university as a utopia. Kerr candidly admitted its faults. It would, for example, prove guilty of what Cardinal Newman charged against the utilitarian university of his own day: "aim[ing] low, but . . . fulfill[ing] its aim."[9] It would witness the eclipse of the authority of teachers by that of administrators and new academic "entrepreneurs." "Power [would] move from inside to outside the original community of masters and students," gravitating toward the administration and those "leadership groups" in society, though Kerr denied this would lead to "control in any del-

eterious sense." (He failed to notice the considerable costs already incurred by the secrecy of nuclear research and academic complicity in the Vietnam War.) And the faculty would "shift their identification and loyalty" to new funding sources, becoming "tenants rather than owners" of the university.[10]

Some saw developments like these as cause for fundamental indictments of the new institution. Paul Goodman reminded readers that universities in their medieval origin and continuing essence were free corporations and self-governing "schools for independent professionals, communities of scholars, and centers of free inquiry." Their job had always been to "educate the free young (*liberi*) to be free citizens and independent professionals." These being its purposes, becoming simply a service station for powerful social interests would be a dangerous misorientation. The research contracts Kerr welcomed Goodman branded "outsider's" work, the pursuit of which and intellectual methods necessary for the completion of which would corrupt the university's traditions and real mission.[11]

Putting the institution under the tutelage of administrators like those Thorstein Veblen had excoriated in *The Higher Learning*, furthermore, would put it under the control of men who would ultimately convert "a community of teaching and learning," into "a teaching machine." Goodman noted in 1964 that the "1900 existing colleges and universities are the only important face-to-face self-governing communities still active in our society."[12] The new managers would change all that, Goodman predicted, and "rationalize" a previously decentralized institution according to business criteria. And that would destroy the university's ability to fulfill its central purpose, which he, like John Dewey, saw as teaching—helping individual students become aware of their "own best powers" and committed to developing them further and being capable of continued self-education after college.[13] The administrators might be good facilities managers; they were no educators.

Despite charges like these the new spokesmen of the higher learning accepted and even celebrated the new knowledge industry because it was, above all, "productive." It was "for everyone's sake" Kerr wrote. It served the national interest and he, like others, assumed that that was the public interest.[14] The desire to serve, to be useful no questions asked and to enjoy the rewards of service trumped any questions Goodman and others might have raised about the requirements and consequences of that service. And the obligations of neutrality prevented faculty from having a say. The multiversity, in any case, was felt to be the end product of a long process of development for a utilitarian institution that had begun with the Morrill Act in 1862. It was the inexorable product of an inevitable evolution.

This was the last and most intriguing aspect of this story. It was a tale of inevitability, and a tale told, then, in the passive voice. "Imperatives" were

imposed that had to be accepted. The university was being "called on" to change with the times. Things were in the saddle and rode men. No one, presumably, made choices. No politics were in play. It was not a question of good or bad, desirable or wrong-headed, simply whether one had gotten aboard the locomotive of history or was complaining back at the station. "The process cannot be stopped," Kerr himself concluded. "The results cannot be foreseen. It remains to adapt."[15]

It was a strange diction to wrap a triumphal tale in. But in order to make it plausible the real history of the American university had to be rewritten at several key points. It had to be pared down, its complexities elided, its real character shaded, and at two points in particular. First, at the point of origin: the story misrepresented the real character of the land-grant institutions and their contribution. Second, at the emergence of the modern institution during Progressivism: while the story acknowledged the institutionalization and professionalization American colleges and universities underwent in these years, it failed to acknowledge the shaping influence exercised by American business over the institution in its formative years. Recent scholarship has cast these chapters in a different light.

Land-grant Origins

That American higher education has always been instrumentalist in character is a proposition usually bolstered by reference to the Morrill Act of 1862, the originating act for the sixty-eight land-grant colleges and universities created in the nation and the basis for their later Extension Services. And it is true that the act mandated teaching "related to agriculture and the mechanic arts."[16] It is also true that the debate leading to the act's passage was rich in derision of Eastern schools, "dead languages," and the practical worth of lessons in the classics. (What would they "do about hog cholera?" one Midwest statesman demanded to know).

As a matter of historical fact, however, Senator Morrill took care in drafting the act to specify that the teaching of agricultural and mechanical arts would occur "without excluding other scientific and classical studies," and lest anyone miss the point, "in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions in life."[17] It was an act, signed by Lincoln, intended to put learning and research to the practical help of local communities in the context of also providing for a liberal education of their working people.

Morrill's model was the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which had been drafted by Jefferson, the founder of the nation's first public university. That ordinance provided that the states to be created out of the Northwest Territory

should establish and "maintain forever . . . [seminaries] of learning," because "religion, morality and knowledge [are] necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind."[18]

Good government and the happiness of mankind do not seem like particularly narrow utilitarian goals. (Nor were the ends pursued by the denominational colleges in the East and South that provided the other tributary into the modern university.) In fact, what is usually seen as a utilitarian orientation in America emerged within a larger Whig-Republican outlook that saw higher education as a critical step in the formation of a self-governing people.[19] The outlook valued practical instruction as but one element of a broader training undertaken "for the dignity of the commonwealth . . . to furnish the [republican] citizen the means to discharging the duties imposed on him." The vision became pervasive throughout the nation in the course of the nineteenth century. The tumult of the gold rush had hardly subsided in California, for example, when settlers called for a state university to disseminate a "sound and liberal learning," produce a common culture from disparate elements, promote equality, and "teach the security and honor of republican principles."[20]

At the end of the century the socialist Edward Bellamy produced a variant of this view presenting higher education not only as a personal right but also as the right of all to live in a civilized society and have educated people as neighbors.[21] The current goals of labor-market training and socioeconomic engineering were not the main concerns of the nineteenth century. Rather, as C. Wright Mills summarized the point,

> the prime task of public education, as it came widely to be understood in this country, was politics: to make the citizen more knowledgeable and thus better able to think and judge of public affairs.[22]

Higher education was regarded, then, as a public good and a public resource, properly paid for by public taxes in order to fulfill public ends. This civic republican view, according to California higher education historian John Douglass, survived through the next century into the New Deal when some Californians urged that a primary job of the state colleges was "interpreting democracy to the people."[23] And memories of it still linger in the collective unconscious, barren though they may be of spokesman and party.

The Burdens and Contribution of Progressivism

The modern American university assumed its original form during the Progressive Era. It was then that higher education acquired graduate schools and research functions, its modern disciplines, elective system, and that peculiar

growth on the body academic unknown to the collegia of Oxford, Padua, and Paris, called a board of trustees. The era is also celebrated because of the Wisconsin Idea, the development of the university into a laboratory, in Frederic C. Howe's words, "an experiment station in politics, in social and industrial legislation, in the democratization of science and higher education" that would help solve community problems.[24] It was a commendable idea, though by proposing to fulfill the public interest through the service of specialized experts and professionals rather than the education of citizens for self-government, it also revealed the drift that had begun in the society from a civic republican to corporate liberal outlook.[25]

The boards of trustees or governors that became ubiquitous in this era were staffed increasingly by businessmen. Naturally viewing the institutions over whom they held fiduciary responsibility as also a business, they launched a long-term conflict over its "ownership" by asserting property rights in the university, its land, and buildings ("the material means of mental production"[26]). It was the "pecuniary surveillance" of these boards and their factotums, the new presidents, that so galled Veblen, both of whom he charged in 1918 with "bootless meddling in academic matters . . . [they were] in no special degree qualified to judge."[27]

More was involved here than just assertions of control or strategic endowment of chairs by philanthropic robber barons bent on laundering their reputations. Business had a shaping role in the basic development of the institution, Clyde Barrow has shown, via the new higher education foundations, which were closely associated with different financial groups (the Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching [CFAT], with Carnegie interests, the American Council on Education [ACE], with Rockefeller interests, etc.). These sought to impose an administrative rationalization on higher education like the business trustees had already imposed in their corporate domains over the fierce resistance of formerly autonomous craft-workers.[28]

In response to a question (anticipating Clark Kerr's later theme), "Shall the University Become a Business Corporation?" a CFAT researcher in 1905 affirmed that it should, and asserted that "the application of [organizing] principles to one industry is little different from the application to any other."[29] The foundations proposed to separate administrative from "production" functions, "scientifically" organize the latter and centralize authority in the hands of administrators schooled in business ways.

The foundations subsequently established standardized measures of student credit hours and faculty course loads, certified departmental specializations, sometimes shaped the content of disciplines, and even set up the categories by which facilities would be classified.[30] Some of this standardization was beneficial in distinguishing meritorious institutions from imposters. But

it also promoted administrative rationalization and imposed what Paul Goodman later called a "spirit-breaking regimentation" on undergraduate studies. And it began the routinization of faculty labor and attempt at administrative supervision of formerly autonomous faculty professionals that would burst into full public view at the end of the twentieth century.[31]

One positive accomplishment must also be credited to this era. It emerged in opposition to these incursions from outside forces. This was the idea of academic freedom, long germinating on these shores and now strengthened by German principles of *lernfrieheit* and *lehrfreihet*. Propounded in defense mainly of mid-West and Western professors who defended Populist economics or other unpopular causes who had run afoul of Veblen's new Captains of Erudition, it received institutional sponsorship in 1915 from the newly founded American Association of University Professors (AAUP). The principle affirmed "freedom of inquiry and research; freedom of teaching within the university or college; and freedom of extramural utterance and action," accompanied by corollary duties, as fundamental to the American university and "in the public interest." Its expression revealed growing faculty aspirations to self-government and an increasing consciousness that they themselves were ultimately responsible for the standards that guided their intellectual lives and institution.[32]

Alert to the threats posed by the emerging structure of authority, the proponents of academic freedom rejected the trustees' and foundations' outlook and declared straightforwardly that "the conception of a university as an ordinary business venture, and of teaching as a purely private employment, manifests a radical failure to apprehend the nature [and] social function . . . [of] the professional scholar."[33] This concept of academic freedom remained, however, unrecognized by authorities and the courts at the time. And faculty possessed few academic senates to assert their claims.

THE MID-CENTURY NARRATIVE IN RETROSPECT

"A university is what a college becomes when the faculty loses interest in students."

—John Ciardi[34]

Factoring these corrections back into the picture we can see what the mid-century picture of the American university missed, which aspects of the developing multiversity it legitimated, and how it lulled the public into a certain quietism as the locomotive of history pushed on toward a new and unexpected terrain. This is to not to deny the story acknowledged the new

institutions' considerable abilities for institution building and attracting funding and students.

But this narrative of university development, first, omitted the original civic republican origins and continuing mission of American colleges and universities. Of the three fundamental functions of American higher education—political, formative (personally, as explained by Goodman), and economic—it concentrated entirely on the third. In so doing it diminished recognition of the public character of the institution, obscured understanding of the preparation needed for self-government, and muted any sense of wrong to arise because of the transfer of portions of a public resource to private industrial control and later privatizations.

Second, the story failed to reconcile the augmented service and research functions of the "knowledge industry" with its primary teaching functions or present a plausible explanation for how they should be related. The discontent provoked by this oversight was expressed initially by students, not faculty, ironically at Kerr's own flagship campus. Within a year of the publication of the remarks quoted above, the Free Speech Movement erupted at UC Berkeley. The immediate issue that provoked the protest was the denial to students of free speech, an understandable casualty of the attempt to replace public reason with administrative rationalization. But the students' larger concern was educational. After noting that "what we have on this campus is an administrative oligarchy," FSM leader Mario Savio famously explained that the reason students "can't take part ["in the operations of the machine"] and had "to put your bodies on the gears" was that they were "sick at heart," not exactly at the free speech ban but at discovering that they were being treated as "raw material" for the "knowledge factory" and as intended products for its "clients" in the society.[35] We had come to the university (the present author being part of that movement) to develop our intellectual abilities and autonomy and decide ourselves how they should be directed socially, not to become pawns and products of someone else's design.

Third, this narrative assigned major decision making about which of the university's functions should be emphasized and what direction it should take to top administrators and outside funders. The defect here was not with the goal of service *per se*. Jefferson's "good government" was a goal for service, as was Cardinal Newman's desire to "raise the intellectual tone of society."[36] The problem was that the new model required that faculty give up their own powers to determine whom their collective effort should serve and to participate in determining what the public interest was. Remaining neutral, they were to entrust their trained energies to ends they did not question and ends that could well be at odds with the social responsibilities with which they had been entrusted.

This model of activity favored a particular intellectual type and professional identity. It was a type who appeared in the political world in the latter years of Progressivism and was perceptively described by Randolph Bourne in his critique of Pragmatism as someone devoted to "the technical" but not "the political or interpretive" side of what was being served. It was a kind of professional, observable in the direction of the First World War, who energetically "accept[ed] with little question the ends as announced from above" and thus became a tool of others' design.[37] That the type would be long-lived was shown by the reflections of an academic fifty years later, in the prosecution of another war. Economics professor Stanley Sheinbaum, coordinator of Michigan State University's aid programs for the CIA in Vietnam, later attributed his and others' "appalling" participation in covert military programs upholding President Diem to the fact that they lacked "historical perspective." They had "been conditioned . . . not to ask the normative question. . . . We have only the capacity . . . to serve the policy" not to "question and judge" it.[38] This kind of intellectual, deft on the technical side and disabled on the political, would feel perfectly at home in the mid-century administrators' view of the university.

It should also be noted that the implied injunction for all workers in the new industry to cede authority to its central mangers overlooked the long-term struggle faculty had been waging on American campuses for academic senates and shared governance. Many American colleges and universities had senates by mid-century and the idea of academic freedom had acquired a great deal of authority. But a new administrative sector had also begun to emerge, deploying centralized, hierarchical authority over a wide range of support functions stretching from the library to facilities management to financial aid. This created what scholars of university governance have called a "dual authority structure,"[39] and what faculty call shared governance. It represented less an accord than a struggle between different bases of power and different models of university governance—a struggle between Goodman's "community" with its collegial decentralization and logic, on one hand, and his centralized "machine" on the other. Considering that industrial managers do not as a rule share power with those they see as junior management or employees, this story of the multiversity-as-knowledge industry was really a story that perceived the dual structure as a passing phase and assumed the campus would confer primary authority on the administrative incubus that had grown up in its midst.

Fourth and finally, this narrative did convey an accurate picture of the divided and potentially conflicted professional identity assumed by twentieth-century college and university faculty. Professionals, who by European tradition and institutional mission should have been governors of their community

accepted the authority of governing boards and presidents, leaving questions about the "ownership" of the institution unsettled. Scholars and teachers who required independence and autonomy for the exercise of their duties had to reconcile themselves to administrative organization and sometimes supervision as a condition of employment, buoyed by the meritocratic hope that their specialized expertise might find favor in the institution's fulfillment of its public service function.[40] Intellectuals who believed in their own freedom and neutrality generally accepted the intellectual borders set by others (especially after seeing the fate suffered by dissidents in the wake of populism, the midst of World War I, and later, of course, McCarthyism) and the obligation of silence on matters beyond their own field of expertise, an obligation that was not shared, we see, by the administrators and trustees.

THIS WAY TO THE KNOWLEDGE FACTORY

The institution portrayed by the mid-century narrative did not mark a final stage in the development of American higher education. The picture presented by Kerr of the multiversity proved to be the snapshot of a moving target. In the years after he wrote the mix of functions continued to shift until the knowledge-service industry became fully dominant, with Newman's liberal-arts college and Flexner's research institute greatly shrunken in size and forced to justify themselves in "industry" terms.

In the decades after its Golden Age, American higher education did not, despite the rosy forecasts, rise from victory to victory but slowly entered a period of crisis and instability noted in the chapters of this book. Since the 1980s state governments have disinvested in higher education, cutting their budgets for postsecondary education by a dramatic national average of 34 percent, measured as a proportion of operating revenues per units of personal income. Between 2002 and 2004 alone, Massachusetts dropped its appropriations by 23 percent, Colorado by 22 percent, and California by 9.6 percent. California's support fell from 18 percent of general fund expenditures in 1976–1977 to only 11.35 percent in 2005–2006.[41]

The mortgage foreclosures, bank failures, and stock market implosion of 2007–2009 shrunk state revenues in California, to take an extreme example, and pummeled higher education even more. As a result the state slashed $2 billion from its higher education budget between 2008–2010, necessitating regular faculty furloughs in fall 2009, pay cuts for the first time in the state's history, and lay-offs of thousands of part-timers. Hundreds of courses were canceled, extending many students' years to graduation despite all the recent efforts to counter that trend. Class sizes grew. The faculty who remained suf-

fered a forced "speed-up"—more work at less pay—despite union contracts, at least in the California State University.

Student tuition and fees were also raised in fruitless attempts to compensate for lost revenues. After fifteen years of previous increases, between 2004 and 2008 UC student tuition and fees had already risen a remarkable 60 percent, and the CSU's tuition and fees rose 36 percent.[42] Then in mid-2009, UC tuition and fees in both systems were jacked up another 32 percent. Such costs violated the state's promise of tuition-free higher education for its citizens, saddled students after graduation with immense debts, and hit minority ethnic families hardest, undoing years of efforts to promote diversity in the state's higher education systems.[43]

The cutbacks have caused a steady reduction of university services, a crowding of classrooms, trimming of programs, and decline in salaries and morale. With declining government support, colleges and universities have become increasingly dependent on private donations, "partnerships," and augmented student tuitions. A number of large universities entered into special no-bid deals with profit-oriented technology giants who provide technology infrastructure in return for them turning over their students and faculty as captive markets. David Noble found such agreements struck by UCLA with Home Education Network, UC Berkeley with AOL, and the University of Colorado with Real Education.[44]

As these forms of funding become accepted as structural elements of university funding, legislators and the public have less and less reason to see college costs as a public investment undertaken "for the dignity of the commonwealth," as they were seen by nineteenth-century civic republicans, and to regard the university as properly paid for by the public. Instead of the older idea of higher education as a public good, campuses are increasingly seen as private goods. The university becomes a display case of private career paths, a site for the advancement of private ambitions, and a mother lode for the academic entrepreneurs Kerr foresaw, an institution appropriately paid for, then, out of private savings and loans. A writer for *The Chronicle of Higher Education* reported already in 2003 that "[L]awmakers increasingly view higher education as a private good that should be supported more by students and donors, rather than as a public good that deserves state support."[45] The civic discourse of higher education in this way is replaced by a business discourse.

Of even greater importance, however, and providing a broader rationale for privatization, the fiscal crisis of the campus has provided the cover for foisting a new model of the university on an unsuspecting public. This is the model of a corporatized university, touted by key university figures nationally, a variety of higher education associations and foundations, and in the Bush administration a federal Secretary of Education. With the emergence of this model we leave not only Cardinal Newman and Paul Goodman, but Clark Kerr himself behind.

Though it takes manifold forms this corporatized model can be understood as the product of three transformations: one in the content or substance of higher education, one in its structure, and the third in its function. The first, the transformation in content, follows from the institution's increasing subservience to business interests following from its dependence on private partnerships and its devotion to only the economic function of higher education. Deals like the controversial 2000 Novartis contract at UC Berkeley put scientific research and graduate training of an entire department under control of profit-making corporations and their attendant ethos of secrecy. And Berkeley's 2007 $500 million agreement with British Petroleum, rushed through without faculty involvement, establishes a research institute on biofuels in which the oil giant's private employees would work side-by-side with campus employees, be treated like faculty with the privileges of teaching, guiding students, and conducting research, in a building constructed with $70 million in taxpayer funds. BP wanted to be "embedded" in the campus, UC's vice chancellor for research said approvingly, in an intriguing turn of phrase, though it "will not be obligated to share its findings with its academic partner."[46]

This is not the two-way merger Kerr confidently predicted, but a one-way encroachment and annexation of a public resource. The purpose of the ostensible partnerships, Noble points out, is to help socialize the costs and risks of the private industries and of job training for the technology sector, while continuing to privatize the profits of partnered labors.[47] Rather than serving the public good, the university increasingly becomes a private research institute.

The "externalization of governance" entailed in these deals leads to efforts to extend business influence more widely. The authors of *What Business Wants from Higher Education* call for curriculum changes across the board to increase instruction in "portable skills," like "problem-solving, information processing, teamwork, communications" and the all-important "flexibility," because "the shelf life" of a college degree is declining.[48] Theirs is a curriculum plan that makes one nostalgic even for a real program in vocational education. Business interests have also secured a large role in the processes by which two dozen states revised their higher education Master Plans.[49] And with the adoption of a perspective and rhetoric that prioritizes short-term economic utility, universities have accelerated their use of short-term economic criteria for making internal decisions. Teaching is addressed by a recent chancellor of the nation's largest university system in a chapter titled "Influence over Product."[50] Outcomes assessments are used to determine resource allocations. Campus budget offices monitor the results of "profit centers." And the more far-sighted seek to alter the standards of faculty evalua-

tion, a Business–Higher Education Forum report calling on administrators to "motivat[e] their faculties to . . . creat[e] a customer-friendly environment for would-be corporate partners," and "adopt hiring, tenure and promotion policies that reward researchers for collaborating with industries."[51]

These innovations strike deep into the core character of what a university traditionally has been. At the center of the academy as revealed in a still-lingering parlance was the institution of a commons. College was a knowledge commons. It was a realm entrusted to current teachers and students by previous generations in which the wisdom of past ages was accessible (in the democratic ideal, to all), knowledge was shared, and the practices of a gift economy rather than a market economy prevailed. It was a place, that is, whose distinctive character trait was collegiality, key relationship was benefaction, and honored figures were those who gave much to others, rather than taking much from them.[52] It was a place where a student's personal "gifts" could be awakened by gifts from others. When a scientist maps part of the human genome, a sociologist clarifies a new aspect of racism, or a student's brainstorm resolves a classroom controversy, everyone wins, in contrast to the zero-sum rewards of the marketplace. It was their exposure to this kind of realm in contemporary society, I believe, that led some witnesses at public hearings in California a few years ago to recall that the college they attended struck them at first like "hallowed ground," an "oasis," a "sanctuary."[53]

The corporate model would destroy what remains of this sanctuary and erect a citadel of proprietary knowledge in its place. That would be a place where discoveries were owned rather than shared, insights were hoarded and faculty members came to regard each other as competitors rather than colleagues. That we are well on the way toward such a world is clear from the fact that where Benjamin Franklin refused to patent his stove and Jonas Salk his polio vaccine (Franklin saying he had benefited from others' inventions and was glad to return the favor), a computer scientist at UC Santa Cruz seeking a way to encrypt messages has acquired a patent on two large prime numbers that "gives him the exclusive right to use the numbers in any way." Other researchers have even patented scientific laws.[54] The corporate campus supplants the commerce of gifts with a commerce of commodities.

The proprietization of campus life and marketization of knowledge[55] chart a process no less fateful for the nation as a whole than the famous enclosures of the seventeenth century were for Europe. They mark the enclosure of the knowledge commons, a process that will shut out most people from the fruits of academic life and the public sphere of the university. As the process proceeds further we can expect scholarly dialogue to atrophy, poor and minority students to lose access to our common heritage, new discoveries to be fenced with patents and copyright, new inventions (like drugs) held hostage to desired profit

margins, and the opportunity costs of lost inventions, foreclosed paths of inquiry, and a miseducated citizenry to skyrocket. Faculty worth, moreover, will be measured not by how well they teach but by how much what they produce will bring in. These are the larger costs of the first face of corporatization.

Corporatization's second face is structural; American colleges and universities increasingly impose corporate methods of governance within their domains. They seek large-scale bureaucracy instead of collegial organization, uniform rules as opposed to diverse practices for different purposes, and a centralization of authority in place of the traditional decentralization. We see on the campuses of the country a reemergence of the old hankering on the part of Progressive era foundations for administrative rationalization. One scholar of the process points out that this is an entirely formal "rationality" that refers only to internal consistency. Systems may thus be "rational" "*even if they do not lead to the desired outcomes*."[56] Of central importance in this structure is the campus budget office, which tends to regard as valid investments only those expenses that lead to tangible, quantifiable products. "If costs yield nonquantifiable goods of the kind common in research and education," Christopher Newfield explains, "it will be hard for finance to certify them as valuable investments."[57]

This adoption of a corporate form of governance undermines the long-term efforts of faculty, as previously noted, to establish shared governance. In recent years trustees have reasserted ownership rights in the university, and many call for an end to tenure.[58] Senates have turned out, Newfield adds on the basis of his study, to be a part less of shared than of "split governance," in which different parties are assigned different areas and faculty are granted "autonomy without control." Unaware of the larger changes around them, the senates could also, Newfield concludes, be described as "cultures of deference."[59]

Corporate organization is promoted finally by campuses' aggressive adoption of a number of restructuring strategies taken over from private industry. These include downsizing (of tenure-track faculty from 57 percent of the instructors thirty years ago to 30 percent today), creation of a two-tier workforce, outsourcing, privatization, speed-up, and the adoption of bogus accountability measures.[60] These measures all work to increase the power of managers and destroy the independence and autonomy necessary for faculty to exercise their role as professionals. They seek to reduce faculty to being just one stakeholder among many (students, non-academic staff, parents, and legislators).[61] Some propose "unbundling" the different roles of faculty, assigning curriculum design, course outline, and grading to other employees, the better to reduce a craft worker to an assembly-line employee as was done long ago in other industries.

Third and last, corporatization transforms the function of the university. Rather than being primarily a place that trains citizens or cultivates the minds

of its students, and beyond even training workers and serving business indirectly, it becomes a place for the direct generation of profits. It becomes a new site for the production of capital, an Education Industry in a way Kerr and his cohorts never imagined. It does this at its research universities by directly patenting, leasing, or selling technological inventions. It does this everywhere by promoting a process of commodification that breaks up teaching and research processes into pieces that can be owned and yield profits—course design, preparation of supplementary materials, lecture recording, and grading—and converting the campus into a veritable mall of profit-making enterprises. It creates and establishes a market in what had formerly been a campus.

The transformation of the university into a site of production "raises for faculty traditional labor issues" entailed in the introduction of new forms of production, Noble writes, and also issues about who has "control over faculty performance and course content." The commodification of the teaching experience also raises for students major questions about coercion, exploitation, and the nature and purposes of a real education.[62] The institutional effects of this transformation of the university into a direct site of capital formation in the current stage of flexible accumulation turn out, furthermore, to be different from what mid-century prognosticators like Adolph Berle, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Kerr expected. Instead of introducing stabilization and security the current regime forces liquidity, flexibility, and rapid change achieved by downsizing, outsourcing, and devaluing "bricks and mortar" in favor of electronic networking—all of which makes for continuous crisis and *de*stabilization.

It is intriguing that to note that Clark Kerr by the publication of the fourth edition of his book saw how things were going and pulled back from his previous advice. This new university and its business-oriented administrators were not what he had had in mind. In the 1995 postscript to his book he added that there was "more to a university" than what sells in the market.

> Some such non-market needs are training for good citizenship, advancing cultural interest and capabilities of graduates, providing critiques of society (we hope from a scholarly perspective), and supporting scholarship that has no early, if ever, monetary returns.

Where he had once denied that "externalizing" governance posed any dangers Kerr now underlined autonomy from outside forces as an essential precondition of a healthy university.[63]

But it was too late. The train had gotten up a head of steam. And the fact that the actual course of development turned out to be different from what he expected reveals a further shortcoming of that mid-century story. The advanced or post-industrial society that had provided the framework for the tale may have been an organizational, bureaucratic terrain. But it was still capitalist. The industry Kerr saw increasingly interwoven with the academy was still a capitalist industry, still driven by the need for profit, still required to find new strategies for capital accumulation, still set on the commodification of new spheres of social activity, still forced to wring profits out of all its activities, and therefore still driven to subject ever-widening circles of social actors to its needs. What Kerr had helped set in motion despite his belief that he was merely adapting on one hand, and that even-handed administrators would wind up running the show on the other, was not the university as a neutral industry (objectionable though that would have been), but the university as capital, the university as a means to accumulation in its own right. The administrator rather than running the show and displacing the private profiteer wound up serving him instead—or rather "it," the capitalist having become a corporate entity.

WHAT'S THE ALTERNATIVE?

This situation not only transforms and degrades university instruction. It also confronts faculty with serious choices because it destroys the terms of their previous role. The support they were supposed to receive if the university became an instrument of national purpose is being withdrawn. The academic freedom and professional autonomy that were to be protected if they accepted the authority of presidents and trustees are under assault. The terms of their previous identity are ceasing to exist. And the corporatized university will exert a steady pressure to reduce their autonomy and importance even further in the effort to commodify their labor. What's the alternative?

The outlines of that alternative are discernible in the campus protests, critiques, and commentaries made over the last half-century. The Berkeley radicals who rebelled against the knowledge factory back in 1964 later published an account of their struggle titled, "We Want a University." The central thing they and other students nationally wanted, not surprisingly, was an institution devoted centrally to teaching. Had the conservative Cardinal Newman been alive, they would have been surprised to find him standing with them. "If its object were scientific and philosophical discovery," Cardinal Newman stated with unimpeachable logic on the first page of *The Idea of the University*, "I do not see why a University should have students."[64]

For Newman the central function of the university was, in a formulation that went back to Seneca, "the cultivation of the intellect." Its goal was "To open the mind, to correct it, to refine it, to enable it to know." And the marks of success in that effort were not degrees or course transcripts, but "force, steadiness, comprehensiveness and versatility . . . the command over our own

powers." This "cultivation" and "opening" of the mind were what Paul Goodman and John Dewey meant by education as a drawing-out (e-duction) of inhering potential, a discovery of "one's best powers" (and not, it may be noted, an inculcation or socialization.)[65]

Important for Newman, as for the nineteenth-century American innovators who wanted to escape the denominational narrowness of sectarian colleges, was the idea of liberal learning in contrast to specialization. That was a kind of learning, Newman explained, that "takes a connected view of old and new, past and present, far and near, . . . [and can] view . . . things at once as a whole. . . . It ever knows where it stands." Not to have mastered it, to be able to take a connected view of things or understand the larger contexts of one's life, he considered "the state of slaves or children."[66] Worries about the shelf life of a degree, or learning how to were not his concern. What is the shelf life of knowing where one stands? Of "seeing things . . . as a whole?"

Over the centuries it was a liberal arts education that was considered particularly suited to provide this kind of cultivation. It was also considered implicit in the very idea of a university, as Newman indicated when he spoke of "a University or Liberal Education" as one and the same thing.[67] Giving it, or one branch of it, a central role would define one characteristic of a genuine university in a democratic society. The other two characteristics of such a university would be its character as a community, and the protection of academic freedom as the constitutive principle of that community. Let us take a look at each.

Liberal Education

The liberal arts tradition, conceived in Greece, codified in Rome, and modified during the Middle Ages, was a tradition that sought to cultivate in its students not so much mastery of different subjects as of different ways of thought and an appreciation of different forms of truths necessary for their maturity. They generally saw seven of these different arts of reasoning and inference, though few thinkers agreed on what the seven were. Though the list of the subjects may have been a source of dispute, however, the purpose of their study was not. The fourteenth-century humanist Vergerio put that the same way as had Cicero: "We call those studies *liberal* which are worthy of [that is, necessary to] a free man."[68] They were the studies Newman would later find necessary to impart an "a connected view of things" to students, and "command over our own powers."

Though the liberal arts are sometimes ridiculed today for the same reasons they were at the time of the Morrill Act—for abstractedness, a vague elitism, preoccupation with dead classics, outmoded dedication to truth "for its own sake"[69]—there was another, submerged branch of the liberal arts tradition that

once flourished in the United States but was pruned back after McCarthyism. It is especially relevant to politically engaged students and faculty, as keen-eyed observers of the 1960s students noted.[70]

This was the orator's or rhetorician's branch of the tradition, associated with the names of the Greek Isocrates (436–338 B.C.) and the Romans Cicero and Quintilian. It sought like the more familiar "philosophic" branch of the tradition associated with Plato and Aristotle to provide a *paidea* or formative education to develop students' intellects, raise them out of mundane affairs, and get them to think about the ends they were pursuing. But it did not seek to do this by appealing to an overarching truth and objective forms (*eidei*) as Plato did. It sought to do it rather by teaching students how to think about and act for the good of the political community as its ends were clarified by paradeigmata drawn from history, comparative politics, and Greek tragedy.[71]

The orators' liberal arts sought to impart the arts of rhetoric and persuasion to train students for "correct speech and right action" in the world—that is, "to produce the active citizen"—and therefore also teach what was necessary to understand "what helps or harms the community." The Greek scholar Werner Jaeger observed, in terms suggestive of the later Jürgen Habermas, that "Isocrates assumes that all higher education of the intellect depends on cultivating our ability to understand one another." His education was not concerned with just an accumulation of facts or teaching his students how to give a good speech;

> it is concerned with the forces that hold society together. These are summed up in the word *logos*. Higher education means education to the use of speech in this sense—speech full of meaning about the essential affairs of the life of society.

If the liberal arts are to be understood as the arts necessary to a free person, then Isocrates argued that his approach alone filled the bill. It was "worthy of a free man" because it alone was capable of preserving the freedom of the city the free man required to exist.[72]

Though Isocrates' name is not a familiar one, it is his legacy running down through Cicero, Quintilian, and Aquinas that gave rise to the humanist tradition in the West.[73] The rhetors' insistence that individual freedom depended on the freedom of the city and "obligations of citizenship" reappeared in the Renaissance insistence on the communal nature of liberty.[74] This is the tradition that produced the Jeffersonian and civic republican approach to higher education. Its goal of training active citizens for the good of the community explains why Americans have never felt it inconsistent, as the philosophic branch does, to combine public and liberal education service (as long as it *is* public service). It was a tradition that was eclipsed in mid-twentieth century by more individualistic approaches to freedom, approaches that also put

"truth" back in the heavens and broke up the marriage of wisdom and eloquence that had been at the heart of the orators' tradition.[75] But it is a tradition that still retains a subliminal attractiveness for Americans. And it is a tradition whose continuing influence is apparent in the work of theorists like Dewey, Goodman, Benjamin Barber, Stanley Aronowitz, and Martha Nussbaum. It provides a liberal arts appropriate to an era that no longer sees the job of college as transmitting unquestioned doctrine, but as helping students reappraise their traditions in light of a changing world and the encounter with other cultures.[76] It is this form of the liberal arts that could ground the university's efforts to help form and inform a democratic society.

The fact that new areas of study need to be included in the liberal arts does not change this. Nor does the fact that a liberal arts education was once the preserve of the elite change the right way of putting the matter proposed by Epictetus: "Rulers may say that only free men should be educated, but we believe that only educated men are free."[77] The fact that many Americans hope college will help them get jobs does not change it either, because they also hope it will also get them a lot more. That also explains, finally, the truth of Jaroslav Pelikan's statement that it would be "no less a denial of opportunity" if formerly underrepresented students gained access to the university only to find that in the interest of more topical concerns they "were deprived of the opportunity to receive a liberal education." The liberal arts could not be reduced to a negligible role in the university without changing fundamentally what the institution is.[78]

Community

The essence of a *universitas*, Karl Jaspers noted, was that it was "a community of teachers and students."[79] And Goodman noted above that universities were the only self-governing communities left in the country. Their use of word was no accident. The university was traditionally a community in, and entrusted with responsibility for, the knowledge commons. That it was a community was a testament to the centuries-old recognition of a vital connection between the mission of the institution and a particular way of organizing collective effort to fulfill that mission. The dialogue, debate, and gift-giving necessary for the cultivation of the different liberal arts and reasoning necessary for free men and women—what Habermas calls communicative interaction—require the mutual confidence, trust, and interdependence provided by a community and a commons, with their face-to-face contacts, dispersed authority, and shared purpose.

Louis Menand notes that among the many qualities sought to be developed by a liberal education is "independence of thought."[80] That is true; but where

does one learn that? In which course is it taught? To the extent it can be taught at all it is only from the process of debate, from first learning what one thinks and then defending it with the available evidence, and from having to change what one thinks when proven necessary. That cannot occur without trust and face-to-face interaction. It cannot occur within a bureaucracy governed by impersonal rules, nor by atomized individuals held together only by rules. It is intriguing to note that the Berkeley students who rebelled against Kerr's bureaucracy immediately identified this as something they were seeking in their educational experience and tried to provide in their movement. ("Although our issue has been free speech," they wrote in the statement mentioned above, "our theme has been solidarity. When individual members of our community have acted, we joined together as a community to jointly bear responsibility for their actions.")[81]

Those students would have been surprised to find Newman with them here again. A century before their protest he expressed his belief that if students and masters came together and mixed freely they would "learn from one another even if there is no one to teach them." He understood the importance of late-night bull sessions in the cafeteria as against, say, the improbable fruits of distance education. The face-to-face interchange, he observed, gave "birth to a living teaching" and "self education" that will never issue from people who have "no mutual sympathies, no intercommunion . . . and no common principles" with each other. So critical was this communitarian aspect of the university to this august figure, that if he were forced to choose between a

> so-called University which gave its degrees to any person who passed an examination in a wide range of subjects, and a university which had no professors or examinations at all, but merely brought a number of young men together for three or four years . . . if I were asked which of these two methods was the better discipline of the intellect . . . which provided better public men, . . . I have no hesitation in giving that preference to that University which did nothing.[82]

Academic Freedom

The third element of a revitalized university would be a renewed commitment to academic freedom. Historically, colleges and universities have had to defend themselves against the aggressions of numerous authorities, church, state, and martial. Today, faculty have to defend themselves against private corporations (and, in intellectual property matters, sometimes their own institution).[83] This and the original AAUP defense of professors' teaching, research, and extramural utterance have led many people to view academic freedom as a matter mainly of defense, and of the liberties of individual professors. But this is not the best way of understanding its origins and character.

The fundamental defense of academic freedom was put best by Immanuel Kant when he identified a fourth primary function to the university we may add to the above three: that of speaking reason to the society. The autonomy exercised through professional research and developed through practices of shared governance is a prerequisite for the fulfillment of this larger public purpose. The early AAUP statement also noted "the social function discharged by the professional scholar." Academic freedom is intended, in other words, not just to protect political dissenters, campus whistle-blowers, or disciplinary innovators, though it is that, but also to protect the entire thought-ways of the university against conventional or commercial or political desires to subject them to its immediate demands.

The basic compact university scholars had with society in Kant's eyes was an "agreement with the citizens to free the mind." It was essential to fulfill the terms of this agreement that,

> the university . . . contain a faculty that is independent of the government's command with regard to its teachings; one that is free to evaluate everything, and concerns itself with the interests of the sciences [broadly conceived], that is, with truth: one in which reason is authorized to speak out publicly.[81]

The university is a means, then, the society establishes for reflection on its own past and thinking about the future, a means by which it gains a perspective on itself. To discard this task of "speaking reason to society" would be to dispense with those means and the training necessary to develop such reflective powers and convert the university from a tool for students finding their own powers to a device for sorting them according to a scheme of social engineering. Instead of the society possessing a means for broadening citizens' minds, it would possess a tool for indoctrinating them and resigning them to the status quo. Instead of educating citizens it would produce subjects.

As important as negative protections of the individual professor are for the fulfillment of this function, the essence of academic freedom is not negative but positive, and on behalf of a collectivity. Though it is rarely noted, the individual freedoms faculty enjoy are products, artifacts, of collegial arrangements—senates, unions, colleges, and previous groups and associations that fought to shore up the rights over the years. Academic freedom in its essence plays a constitutive role in collective self-governance and institutional co-governance. Aronowitz explains it as "the right of the faculty as a collectivity to retain sovereignty over the educational process."[85] It is the essential corporate right of faculty to self-governance. Academic freedom entails not only immunities, then, but also capacities—not only a freedom *from* power but a freedom, and obligation, to be part *of* power.

These positive rights of faculty as a collectivity and corporate body are under heavy assault by the new administrative regime and the fiscalization of decision making. To strengthen the positive and the negative aspects of academic freedom it will be necessary for faculty to reassert their autonomy. Not complete autonomy. Theirs is a professional autonomy, within specialized standards and traditions.[86] And it is a moral autonomy to participate in determining the social purposes their university serves. For universities should serve their societies. Performing basic and applied research in the biosciences and public health, energy, food productivity, and transportation is consistent with the purposes of higher education, especially with America and the world in the condition they are in today.

This autonomy needs to be reasserted even though it promises to be a flashpoint of conflict. The authors of *What Business Wants* have already stated that, "The autonomous culture of higher education may . . . work against developing the [marketable] skills" that are needed, suggesting that it is time to retire this quaint remnant of a bygone era. They and many campus officials clearly prefer "flexibility" to autonomy.[87]

REDEFINING THE PROFESSION

> Education is a moral and political practice and always presupposes a . . . preparation for particular forms of social life, a particular rendering of what community is, and what the future might hold.
>
> —Henry Giroux[88]

> The faculty must change . . . [or] it will . . . be reduced to a profession in name only.
>
> —James E. Sullivan[89]

Consideration of this alternative model of the university brings us back to reflections on the role of college and university faculty. Embattled as it is, the faculty remains the sole obstacle to the ongoing corporatization of the university. That the authorities mean to clear away this last impediment is clear from their announcements that they mean to "change faculty culture," and the U.S. Department of Education's Spellings Report's taking of faculty to task for being "risk averse" and dragging their feet responding to "this consumer driven environment."[90]

Important as their action is, however, most faculty members remain diffident about resisting the master trend discussed in this chapter. Conceiving of

academic freedom as a private right to teach and research whatever they want, they ignore the weakening of the collegial bases of those rights. Regarding academic neutrality as necessary to their professional identity, many believe that quietism is acceptable, even desirable. And here, finally, it is necessary to return to that contested and confusing concept.

What exactly is this neutrality? No one expects a teacher to be neutral and impartial between truth and falsehood, or good writing and bad, or originality and plagiarism. A judge who remained impartial between valid testimony and perjury would be impeached. What is called neutrality is in fact a withholding of judgment between options at a critical point in a complex proceeding governed by principles and standards that are themselves deeply value-laden. Scholars spend years mastering those principles, learning how to recognize the valid options and determining what to be neutral about, as do judges and laboratory scientists.

It is not because of neutrality or lack of commitment that a faculty member is expected to treat all students equally and/or eschew indoctrination, or a scholar is required to revise past conclusions in light of new evidence. Nor is it because of the search for objective Truth, lying beyond subjectively colored appearances. (To the extent such a motive inspires faculty at all, it is probably of a Peircean rather than a Platonic character, seeing truth as the hoped-for convergence of opinion "by all who investigate" and a goal for the future, not something hovering over the present.)[91] The reason a faculty member is expected to do these things or refrain from doing them is because of a positive, biased, commitment to the values of teaching and cultivation described above.

I refrain from foisting my political convictions on students and using my classroom for indoctrination not because I am neutral or apolitical, but because doing these things would interfere with what I need to accomplish with the students, because of my own larger politics and those of my profession as a faculty member.[92] Toni Morrison makes this point when she explains, "Values are implicit in everything I say, write and do." And, she adds, the university needs to "take seriously and rigorously its role as guardian of wider civic freedoms, as interrogator of . . . complex ethical problems, as servant and preserver of deeper democratic practices."[93] This is a statement of principle and purpose, not neutrality.

The concept of neutrality suggests a backing away from bias, a quashing of passion, a disinterest. But undertaking teaching or scholarship, being willing to accept uncomfortable new facts or making sure the campus remains an interrogator of complex problems is not a sign of neutrality, banked passions, or disinterest. It is the sign of principled, even passionate, commitment to particular intellectual values and principles. And the fulfillment of those values in the academy requires not depoliticization, but a specific politics within the university and a politics between the university and the society.[94] The attempt of mid-century academics to deny this was a result, epistemologically, of a false analogy between the ways of the social sciences and those of the physical sciences. It would help faculty members today to be at least as active as private foundations, business roundtables, and rump parliaments of term-limited legislators in determining their fate if they dispensed with that analogy and took a firmer public stand defending the principles of a liberal university than they have in recent decades. There is no one else to do it.

Without a conscious, public commitment to its liberal arts values and politics the university will not survive. And with its demise would go the hopes for a democratic society, for "the autonomy that we seek . . . may be the most powerful tool we have for reshaping liberal education in the interests of promoting democracy and citizenship."[95] Many of its current officials already believe that such essential aspects of the institution as tenure, shared governance, autonomy, and independence of mind are relics of a bygone era. What counts for them is the "value-added" of their products (that is, students) for prospective clients. For faculty to defend these traditional elements of a university, however, they will have to think about their role in new ways. "The faculty must [undergo] . . . a self-determined transformation," explains professor and former faculty-union organizer James Sullivan.

> A profession without power and autonomy is no profession at all. . . . Only if a majority of faculty nationwide . . . succeed in re-creating their culture from within will there be a realistic chance for establishing a true profession.[96]

And to recreate their culture from within they must create their own narrative and establish their own point of view. They must also extend their citizenship beyond their narrow disciplines and departments into the larger life of the university and remember that their calling is fundamentally collective in its character.

Many faculty are seeking to do this today by making their senates more than cultures of deference, joining unions and affiliating with activist students and staff. One-quarter of the nations' professors are now union members, and some of those unions are moving beyond their traditional wages-and-hours roles to become participants in university planning and what Aronowitz has called "agents of a new educational imagination."[97]

The promise in the idea of public higher education was not simply that of securing a particular funding base or drawing students from a particular population base, but—and this holds also for private colleges and universities too—educating students to become free as members of a democratic public. "Public

education . . . is necessarily about the education of public persons," Benjamin Barber writes. Universities should be "schools of publicness; institutions where we learn what it means to *be* a public." (The point is "not that the university has a civic mission, but that the university *is* a civic mission.")[98]

The corporate road map for higher education is not concerned with such things. But in recalling that a real university is a place for liberal learning and for the good of the commonwealth, faculty would find a reason to shake off their own inaction, revive their fellow citizens' commitment to higher education and resume the long-term struggle for a genuine university.

NOTES

1. A. Brownstein, "Tuition Rises Faster than Inflation and Faster than in Previous Year," *Chronicle of Higher Education* 17 (October 2000): 25(A).
2. Stanley Aronowitz, *The Knowledge Factory, Dismantling the Corporate University and Creating True Higher Education* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), 15, 62, 97. Others like Louis Menand add what they see as the threats of multiculturalism and postmodernism. See Louis Menand, "The Limits of Academic Freedom," in *The Future of Academic Freedom*, ed. Louis Menand (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1996), 3–20.
3. Top administrators' "grasp of the mission of the university is [f]or the most part . . . articulated in terms of (a) the job market and (b) the stock market." Aronowitz, *Knowledge Factory*, 62.
4. See David Bollier, *Silent Theft, The Private Plunder of our Common Wealth* (New York: Routledge, 2003), Ch. 9; and David Noble, California Faculty Association, "Future of the University" hearing (Los Angeles, May 9, 2000. Author's notes.).
5. Sixty percent of this went for "scientific and technological progress," and 3 percent for the social sciences. In one year in the early 1960s, six universities received 57 percent of it and 20 universities, 79 percent. Clark Kerr, *The Uses of the University* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), 53–55.
6. Aronowitz, *Knowledge Factory*, 27, 2; Louis Ménand, "The Marketplace of Ideas" (New York: American Council of Learned Societies, Occasional Papers, No. 49, 2001), 2.
7. Kerr, *Uses*, 8, 3, 5.
8. Kerr, *Uses*, 28, 87–90. Kerr saw the growth of administrative specialization and independence as an automatic product of organizational evolution and "the managerial revolution that has been going on in the university." (28) Illustrative of the "merging" of institutions: "Sometimes industry will reach into a university laboratory . . . ; and the university in turn reaches into industry, as through the Stanford Research Institute." (89–90).
9. John Henry Cardinal Newman, *The Idea of the University* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1927 (Orig. 1852), 117.
10. Kerr, *Uses*, 8, 41–42, 57–59, 88.

11. Paul Goodman, *Compulsory Mis-education and the Community of Scholars* (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), 122, 124, 139–40. The "service station reference" was Flexner's from "Universities: American, English, German" (1930), cited in Richard Hofstadter and William Smith, *American Higher Education: A Documentary History* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1961), II, 907.
12. Goodman, *Compulsory Mis-education*, 232, 172, 167, 197.
13. Goodman, *Compulsory Mis-education*, 139–40, 109.
14. Kerr, *Uses*, 45, 114, 124.
15. Kerr, *Uses*, 86–87, 124.
16. For example, though a critic of the fact, Kimball wrote, "Proponents of the land-grant movement, for example, saw the traditional [liberal arts] curriculum as their nemesis, and the passage of the Morrill Act . . . testified to their influence." Bruce Kimball, *Orators and Philosophers, A History of the Idea of Liberal Education* (New York: The College Board, 1995), 156.
17. Hofstadter and Smith, *American Higher Education* II, 568. See also Iowa Senator Suttons's defense of a liberal arts curriculum for the land-grant college at Ames, Iowa, in 1884, 587. The stipulation for liberal arts instruction actually provided the basis for the normal American provision, almost unique among the nations, for students to get a liberal arts degree first before concentrating on a more practical or professional course of study. Martha Nussbaum, *Cultivating Humanity, A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1997), 129.
18. Jefferson's creation was the University of Virginia. Under his plan it dispensed with administrative machinery altogether, along with the taking of attendance, grading, and the granting of degrees. He also introduced a system of electives, and wrote about "the councils of the faculty." Goodman, *Compulsory Mis-education*, 220–21. The Northwest Ordinance is in Hofstadter and Smith, II.
19. Jefferson wrote to Madison in 1787, "The only sure reliance for the preservation of our liberty is to educate and inform the whole mass of the people." Benjamin Barber, *An Aristocracy of Everyone: The Politics of Education and Future of America* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1992), 223–24.
20. John A. Douglass, *The California Idea and American Higher Education* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), 22–25, 31, 35, 39, 44, 99. "[I]n a republic at least, knowledge is the great leveler; . . . it levels up, it does not level down" (31). One delegate to the California Constitutional Convention of 1849 explained, "A knowledge of laws . . . [is] an essential element of freedom, and makes public education of primary importance" (25).
21. This was because "the men and women with whom we mingle" every day are "as much conditions of our lives as the air we breathe." Edward Bellamy, *Looking Backward* (New York: Signet Classic, 1960), 150–51.
22. C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University, 1957), 317.
23. Douglass, *California Idea*, 159, from a 1939 State Department or Education publication. Also, 139, 155–56.
24. Despite its utilitarian applications, LaFollette's and Von Hise's idea did emphasize state service, and "the training students received . . . pointed them less toward

professionalism than toward cooperation" with the community in solving social problems. David P. Thelen, *The New Citizenship: Origins of Progressivism in Wisconsin* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1972), 123. See also Lincoln Steffens, "Sending a State to College," *The American Magazine* (February 1909): 349–64.

25. Clyde Barrow, *Universities and the Capitalist State: Corporate Liberalism and the Reconstruction of American Higher Education, 1894–1928* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 97, 150.

26. Barrow, *Universities*, Ch. 2. Kimball, *Orators and Philosophers*, 110.

27. Thorstein Veblen, *The Higher Learning in America*, 1918, in *The Portable Veblen*, ed. Lerner (New York: Viking Portable, 1948), 508, 510–11. In the last words of *The Higher Learning* Veblen excoriated both the governing boards and the academic executive "all [of whose] works are anathema," 538. Flexner also worried about the potential for trustee and presidential "usurpation." In Hofstadter and Smith, *American Education*, 920.

28. Barrow delineates the connections between the foundations and different financial groups, and businessman predominance on the boards, Ch. 2. The foundations established the dominance of behaviorism in the social sciences. Peter J. Seybold, "The Ford Foundation and the Triumph of Behavioralism in American Political Science," in *Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism*, ed. R. I. Arnove (New York: Macmillan, 1980), 269; and David Horowitz, "Billion Dollar Brains: How Wealth Puts Knowledge in its Pocket," *Ramparts Magazine* 7 (May 1969): 36–44. They were also crucial in establishing area studies and foreign policy institutes, which within a few decades would play decisive and often covert roles in U.S. foreign policy; David Horowitz, "Sinews of Empire," *Ramparts Magazine* 8 (October 1969): 32–42.

29. Morris Cooke, quoted in Barrow, *Universities*, 66, 70, 119. Cooke's report charged the university "for the first time with the responsibility to train people for jobs, rather than for character, citizenship or leadership" (119).

30. Barrow, *Universities*, 64–75.

31. Goodman, *Compulsory Mis-education*, 126, 123. Concerning the covert politics of Taylorist scientific management, see R. J. Lustig, *Corporate Liberalism, The Origins of Modern American Political Theory, 1890–1920* (Berkeley, Calif.: U.C. Press, 1982), Ch. 6.

32. AAUP, "1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure," AAUP offprint, 2–3. Also Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metzger, *The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States* (New York: Columbia University, 1955), Part II, Ch. 9, "Academic Freedom and Big Business"; and Barrow, *Universities*, Ch. 7.

33. AAUP, "Declaration of Principles," 3. Thomas Haskell notes that "The central thrust of the 1915 report was to displace trustees as sole interpreters of the public interest and put forth a strong claim for the corporate authority of [university] professional communities." In Menand, *Future of Academic Freedom*, 58.

34. Cited by Carlin Romano, "The Troves of Academe" *The Nation* (June 12, 2000): 53.

35. Cited in D. Goines, *The Free Speech Movement. Coming of Age in the Sixties* (Berkeley, Calif.: Ten Speed Press, 1993), 361. Kerr, interestingly, had seen the potential for revolt when he recognized the students as the primary victims of the transformation he described. "The walking wounded are many." *Uses*, 42.

36. Though Cardinal Newman's have sometimes been presented as abstract and withdrawn, they were anything but that. In his eyes the university "aims at raising the intellectual tone of society, at cultivating the public mind, at purifying the national taste, at supplying true principles to popular enthusiasm and fixed aims to popular aspiration, at . . . facilitating the exercise of political power, and refining the intercourse of private life." Newman, *Idea*, 177.

37. Randolph Bourne, "Twilight of the Idols," in *War and the Intellectuals, Collected Essays*, ed. C. Resek (New York: Harper Torchbooks. 1964), 60. I speak of a general pattern here; there were notable exceptions. The U.C. professors fired by the Board of Regents in 1949–1950 for refusing to sign the loyalty oath were such exceptions.

38. From Horowitz, "Sinews," 38, 42. The president of Michigan State University at the time was a chair of the Rockefeller Foundation-sponsored American Council of Education.

39. L. Jackson Newell, "College and University Governance," in *A History of Thought and Practice in Educational Administration*, ed. R. Campbell, et al. (New York: Teachers College, 1987), 155, 158, citing John Corson, *The Governance of Colleges and Universities*, 1960. Kerr acknowledged the struggle for faculty governance on passing but minimized its importance, *Uses*, 43.

40. This analysis follows Barrow's insightful discussion, *Universities*, 8–10.

41. Between 1979 and 1985 state higher education funding as a proportion of operating appropriations (per $1,000 of personal income), fell from $10.50 to $9.25, then plummeted again to $6.90 in 2005. William Zumeta, "The New Finance of Public Higher Education," *NEA 2006 Almanac of Higher Education* (Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 2006), 39, 42. Cutbacks in federal loans together with the tuition increases resulting from this reduced funding now saddle graduating seniors with an average $19,000 in debt, according to the Project on Student Debt. S. Block, "More College Students Saddled with Big Debt," *Sacramento Bee*, 12 June 2006, 6(A). Also Zumeta, "New Finance," 46. The California figures are from California Department of Finance, "General Fund Program (Expenditure) Distribution," Chart C, July, 2005; and D. Macaller, Taqi-Eddin, and Schiraldi, "Class Dismissed: Higher Education vs. Corrections During the Wilson Years" (Washington, D.C: Justice Policy Institute, 1998).

42. Tom Mortenson, "California at the Edge of a Cliff," Sacramento: California Faculty Association, 2009, 11; Laurel Rosenhall, "UC, CSU May be Bargain—But Ouch!" *Sacramento Bee*, May 7, 2009, A1. W. Zumeta, "State Support of Higher Education: The Roller Coaster Plunges Downward Yet Again," *The NEA 2009 Almanac of Higher Education*, 37.

43. "Class Dismissed," 5–6. CEPC, "Fiscal Profiles, 2008," Display 41, "Resident Undergraduate Student Fee in 2008 Constant Dollars;" and Mortenson, 11–12. The share of higher education funding assumed by students' families increased from 35 percent to 48 percent in those years while state and local support dropped from 55.5 percent to 43 percent. W. Zumeta, 2001, 81.

44. David Noble, *Digital Diploma Mills: The Automation of American Higher Education* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2002). Already by 1988 Harvard had sixty-nine corporate relationships, Stanford forty, and MIT thirty-five, for an average among the large schools of twenty-two research, plus patent agreements with private companies. Aronowitz, *Knowledge Factory*, 44.

45. Jeffrey Salingo, "The Disappearing State of Higher Education," *Chronicle of Higher Education* 18 (February 2003), 22(A).

46. The former deal was a $25 million five-year alliance between UCB's Plant Biology department and multinational life-sciences Novartis based in Switzerland, the terms of which prevented professors and graduate students who participated in the project from discussing their work until it was published, and gave Novartis first rights to license what they invented. Goldie Blumenstyk, "A Vilified Corporate Partnership Produces Little Change (Except Better Facilities)," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 22 June 2001, 24–27(A). The British Petroleum arrangement was reported by Goldie Blumenstyk, "Berkeley Professors Seek Voice in Research-Institute Deal with Energy Company," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 13 April 2007, 33(A).

47. David Noble reported on the agreements between UCLA and the Home Education Network, UC Berkeley and America OnLine, the University of Colorado and Real Education. Noble, D., "Digital Diploma Mills," Part II, March 1998, (article in author possession), 2.

48. D. Oblinger and A-L. Verville, *What Business Wants from Higher Education* (Phoenix: Oyrx Press and American Council on Education [ACE], 1998), 8, 18, 26, 90.

49. "The views and needs of business are at the heart of nearly all of the long-range higher-education plans [the states] . . . are considering." P. Schmidt, "States Set a Course for Higher-Education Systems: Master Plans Aim to Insure Cohesive Response to . . . Changes," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 20 June 2000, 7–8(A).

50. Former California State University Chancellor Barry-Munitz, Ch. 3, "Managing transformation in an age of social triage," in *Reinventing the University* eds. Coopers and Lybrand, Johnson and Rush (New York: Wiley and Co., 1995).

51. Basinger, "College Presidents Urged to Nurture Relationships with Businesses," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 22 June 2001, 27(A).

52. On the commons as a gift economy see Lewis Hyde, *The Gift, Imagination and the Erotic Life of Property* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 4, 47. And Bollier, *Silent Theft*.

53. California Faculty Association "Future of the University" hearings, San Jose, February 4, 2000; Los Angeles, May 9, 2000; Sacramento, Nov. 16, 2000.

54. "Hot Type" review of Edmund Morgan, *Benjamin Franklin* (2002), *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 13 September 2002, 18(A). Seth Shulman, "We Need New Ways to Own and Share Knowledge," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 19 February 1999, 64(A).

55. Bollier, *Silent Theft*, 139.

56. R. Birnbaum, *Management Fads in Higher Education* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000), 27–29. The academic fads of the 1970s and 1980s including program budgeting, Management by Objective, Zero-Base Budgeting, and more, furthered the erroneous idea of the university as a rational whole, Birnbaum wrote, because even though they failed they "helped change the way people thought about [higher education] institutions" (154). See also Linda DeLeon and Robert Denhardt, "The Political Theory of Reinvention" (Washington, D.C., American Political Science Association, 1997).

57. Christopher Newfield, "Recapturing Academic Business," *Social Text* 15 (Summer 1997): 44, 48; Aronowitz, *Knowledge Factory*, 58–59.

58. The Association of Governing Boards "Statement on Institutional Governance," November 8, 1998, Washington, D.C. retreated from support for the AAUP's statement on shared governance (amended 1990), which it and ACE previously commended. The American Association of State Colleges and Universities (AASCU) issued a report asserting governing board authority over the university. C. Leatherman, "Shared Governance Under Siege: Is It Time to Revive or Get Rid or It?" *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 20 December 1998. The AGB proposed banning individuals active in faculty unions from participation in other organs of shared governance. In 2007 over half (56 percent) of the trustees polled wanted to replace tenure with long-term contracts. Jeffrey Selingo, "Trustees More Willing than Ready: Chronicle Survey," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 11 May 2007, 21(A).

59. Newfield, "Recapturing," 59–61.

60. Data on tenure-track faculty from AAUP report based on federal Education Department data. It reported that adjuncts—part-timers and full-timers on a tenure-track—have grown in the same time from 43 percent of faculty to nearly 70 percent at public and private colleges and universities. A. Finder, "Decline of Tenure Track Raises Concern," *New York Times*, 20 November 2007.

61. Cary Nelson, "The War Against the Faculty," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 16 April 1999.

62. Noble, "Digital Diploma Mills," (article author possession), October 1997, 5.

63. Clark Kerr, *The Uses of the University*, 4th ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 182, 192–93.

64. Newman, *Idea*, ix.

65. Newman, *Idea*, xv–xvi, 122, 125. Goodman, *Compulsory Mis-education*, 140.

66. Newman, *Idea*, 134–38, 113. Also, 101, 106–107.

67. Newman, *Idea*, 105, 102.

68. The classic seven arts were grammar, logic, rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. Kimball, *Orators and Philosophers*, 2, 59, 175. Aquinas redefined them. Kimball, *Orators and Philosophers*, 66. Colonial America redefined them again, into: classical languages, literature, rhetoric, geometry, mathematics, and natural and moral philosophy. Newell, "College," 152.

69. Though Newman often used this phrase, he was a practitioner of what might be called a higher practicality, being an institution-builder as rector of new Catholic University of Ireland, starting a medical school, and introducing science, history, and geography into his liberal arts, among other achievements. Pelikan writes that Newman opposed utilitarianism as a barrier to a larger utility of the university. *The Idea of the University: A Reexamination* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, 1992), 34, and Chs. 4, 8.

70. The Berkeley professors Jack Schaar and Sheldon Wolin observed that the FSM protestors were defending "the principles of a liberal education which their elders had mislaid somewhere among the other functions of the multiversity." *The Berkeley Rebellion and Beyond* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), 22.

71. "The history of liberal education is the story of a debate between orators and philosophers." Kimball, *Orators and Philosophers*, 2. Werner Jaeger developed this thesis earlier, *Paidea*, Vol. III. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), 64, 102. Isocrates resembled Thucydides in seeing politics as subject to the temptations of hubris and laws of tragedy. Jaeger, 101, 108. Regarding his debate with Plato, see D. Mirhady and Y.L. Too, *Isocrates I* (Austin: University of Texas, 2000), 221, 213, 15.

72. Jaeger, *Paidea*, 129, 143–44. Passage early in paragraph, 71, and 148; Isocrates' "Antidosis," in Mirhady and Too, *Isocrates*, 221, 213, 233, 253. Cicero held oratory above the other arts because it required someone "polished in all those arts . . . proper for a free citizen." *De oratore*, quoted in Kimball, *Orators and Philosophers*, 36.

73. Jaeger wrote that modern humanism is "a continuation of the rhetorical strain in classical culture." Jaeger, *Paidea*, 46–47. Kimball, *Orators and Philosophers*, considered Isocrates "the father of liberal education" and "humanistic culture," 19, and citing Proussis, 20. Mirhady and Too, *Isocrates*, 204.

74. "[T]he *artes liberals* 'make men free' as they become 'bound by a common bond, with a common culture, members of a more universal *res publica*.'" Kimball, *Orators and Philosophers*, 115, and 122. Jaeger, *Paidea*, 46–47.

75. Goodman, *Compulsory MisEducation*, 124; Kimball, *Orators and Philosophers*, 126.

76. Sara Hebel, "Poll Shows Value Americans Place on a College Education," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 12 May 2000. According to a *Chronicle* survey, 85 percent of the public believes that preparing students to be responsible citizens is very important or important. Jeff Selingo, "What Americans Think," 2 May 2003. Also see Sara Hebel, "Public Colleges Emphasize Research but the Public Wants a Focus on Students," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, (2 May 2003), 14(A). Lord Acton wrote on this latter function of the modern university that it should be "our deliverer not only from the undue influence of other times, but from the undue influence of our own." Lord Acton, in Pelikan, *Reconsideration*, 131. And Nussbaum, *Cultivating Humanity*, 100.

77. Kimball, *Orators and Philosophers*, 214.

78. Newman, *Idea*, 102, 105–106. Pelikan, *Reconsideration*, 149.

79. Karl Jaspers, *The Idea Of the University* (Boston: Beacon Hill Press, 1959), 62.

80. Louis Menand, "Re-imagining Liberal Education," *Education and Democracy*, ed. R. Omill (New York: College Board, 1997), 2.

81. In Seymour Martin Lipset and Sheldon Wolin, *The Berkeley Student Revolt* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1965), 209. This was also a major theme of SDS's "Port Huron Statement," June 1962, Port Huron, Michigan.

82. Newman, *Idea*, 145, 147–48.

83. Rabban, D., "Academic Freedom: Individual or Institutional?" *Academe* (November–December 2001): 16–20.

84. Immanuel Kant, *The Conflict of the Faculties*, Mary J. Gregor, trans. (New York: Abaris Books, 1979), 27–29. Menand proposes a modern formulation of this in "Limits of Academic Freedom." (8). He notes that academic freedom is not simply a "bonus" for university employees; "It is the key legitimating concept of the entire enterprise." (4)

85. Aronowitz, *Knowledge Factory*, 65. See also Haskell, in Menand, *Future*, 46, 54.

86. "It is, in short, not the absolute freedom of utterance of the individual scholar, but the absolute freedom of . . . the academic profession, that is asserted by this declaration of principles." AAUP "Dismissal proceedings," cited by Ernst Benjamin, "Contractual Protection of Academic Freedom: Tenure and Collegial Review," April 2006, 5. See also Charles W. Anderson on a profession as community of practice. *Pragmatic Liberalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 49, 53.

87. Oblinger and Verville, *What Business Wants*, 18, 82.

88. Henry Giroux, "Neoliberalism, Corporate Culture, and the Promise of Higher Education," *Harvard Educational Review* 72, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 441.

89. "Future of the University" hearing, California Faculty Association, Sacramento, November 16, 2000.

90. The former phrase was repeated by California State University Chancellor Charles Reed when he first assumed office in 1998. The latter is quoted in K. Field, "Spellings Commission Report Warns of Perils of Complacency for American Colleges," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 1 September 2006, 37–38(A).

91. Peirce also saw the search for truth as being undertaken by communities of inquiry and truths established by collective reason and inter-subjective standards of proof. C. S. Peirce, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," in *Values in a Universe of Chance*, ed. P. Weiner (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1958), 133; Lustig, *Corporate Liberalism*, 161, 167, 263.

92. Nussbaum writes that the renaissance humanists' invocation of the standard of neutrality with reference back to Greek and Roman was itself eminently political. Nussbaum, *Cultivating Humanity*, 103.

93. Toni Morrison, "How Can Values Be Taught in This University," *Michigan Quarterly Review* (Spring 2001): 278.

94. Reminiscent of Kant's formulation was C. Wright Mills's explanation of the larger politics of the university as consisting in its ability to give "individuals and publics . . . confidence in their own capacities to reason." *Sociological Imagination*, 187.

95. Alexander Astin, "Liberal Education and Democracy: The Case for Pragmatism," in Orrill, *Education and Democracy*, 222.

96. California Faculty Association hearing, CSU Sacramento, November 16, 2000.

97. Aronowitz, *Knowledge Factory*, 101.

98. Barber, *Aristocracy*, 14, 146, 222. "[P]ublic education is general, common, and thus in the original sense 'liberal.'" (15).